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231 tinues to be bred and raised by the traditionally backward East European methods.

TABLE 26

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LIVESTOCK IN SOCIALIST SECTOR IN 1952*

Country	Percent of Land in Socialist Sector	Cattle	Sheep	Hogs	Horses
Czechoslovakia	48.0	33.0	39.7	38.0	—
Poland	17.0	7.8	—	9.2	7.1
Bulgaria	53.0	25.2	29.9	17.6	43.5

* Sources: Czechoslovakia, Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo*, February 5, 1953; Poland, *Wies w Liczbach*, p. 25 (Warsaw, 1951); Bulgaria, Chervenkov, *For a Lasting Peace*, September 11, 1953.

141 While animal husbandry lagged, industrial crops crept ahead. Even in this realm, despite increased investments, results have not been spectacular. Few reliable production statistics are available. Table 27 shows only the increase in area given over to industrial crops.[27]

2. *The Return on the Investment*

423 In its basic features the picture thus far drawn of East European agriculture resembles the one drawn earlier of Soviet agriculture: a strenuous effort to force the peasantry into a farm system over which the State could exercise direct administrative control; a feverish effort to build modernized industry at a pace which precluded much investment in agriculture; a resultant stagnation of and, in some instances, a deterioration of, agricultural production; and a constant tension between State and the peasants arising from their unending struggle over the fruits of the peasants' labors.

In the USSR, however, the victory of the State over the peasantry was concluded with far greater finality than in Satellite Eastern Europe; the system held together over a quarter of a century which included the most severe war-time trials. Collectivization in the USSR possesses stability because it has managed to provide the State with the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for its economic

[27] It is significant that among the many steps taken to implement the New Course in several East European countries was the reduction of the area sown with industrial crops.

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TABLE 27

AREA UNDER INDUSTRIAL CROPS 1949 - 1951/52*

(1000 hectares)

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	1949						1951/52					
	C	P	H	R	B	Y	C	P	H	R	B	Y
Cotton	–	–	37	60	–	42	–	–	40	150	–	56
Flax	28	109	22	–	–	14	–	–	–	–	–	10
Hemp	5	13	28	–	–	108	–	19	–	–	–	50
Sugar beets	194	250	113	62	31	89	219	275	115	81	32	100
Tobacco	6	14	22	9	30	35	–	20	–	–	–	37

* Data from unpublished manuscript of Dr. Nicholas Spulber (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

program. The question with respect to Eastern Europe is whether collectivization has provided the same agricultural cushion as it did for the USSR. Specifically, does the collectivized sector in the Satellites provide the State with a higher proportion of the total produce marketed per hectare than the private sector? As was shown, the capacity of the Soviet collectivized sector to produce for the market was its very reason for existence.

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The evidence available from Eastern Europe is too scattered and unreliable to justify the type of definite conclusion drawn from the Soviet materials.[38] However, on the basis of an examination of each country in Eastern Europe, some tentative conclusions can be reached.

Throughout the following comparison of the "Socialist" and private sectors, the variety of advantages which the "Socialist sector" enjoys should be kept in mind. First, on the whole the "Socialist sector" comprises better and more fertile land. It is composed of larger farms, capable of supporting more people. In particular, State Farms are frequently, though not always, located on the prosperous lands once belonging to nobles, aristocrats, or German landholders. Second, the "Socialist sector" has at its dis-

[38] The transformation of statistics from an objective science into an arm of State propaganda occurred in the USSR in 1930-31, but several years were necessary for the completion of the task. As a result, there is a great deal more information available concerning the first and second Five Year Plans in the USSR than concerning the Satellite economic developments after 1947. The Satellite Communists, after all, borrowed their techniques of falsification when they had been thoroughly developed in the USSR.

posal most of the available farm machinery, either confiscated or purchased after the Second World War and also what has since been manufactured. In Poland in 1951, for example, the "Socialist sector," comprising some 17 per cent of the arable land, had at its disposal 98 per cent of the nation's tractor supply.[39] In Bulgaria in 1948 the "Socialist sector," then comprising only eight per cent of the arable land, already had at its disposal 81 per cent of the tractors and threshing machines.[40] Third, the "Socialist sector" received a high portion of the meager State credits extended to the farm population for constructing new buildings, purchasing fertilizers, seed, and fodder. And fourth, the "Socialist sector" generally received more favorable trade terms from government agencies, and benefited from official tax and delivery quota discrimination against the private sector. The agricultural structure of each country will be analyzed in terms of the above-stated criteria.

BULGARIA

As everywhere, pertinent information is sparse and only suggestive. The State Farms, occupying 2.5 per cent of the arable land, market 1.5 per cent of the nation's grain crop. The "Socialist sector," occupying 52.0 per cent of the arable land, markets 65 per cent of the grain; and the private farms, composing 45.5 per cent of the arable land, market 33.5 per cent of the grain crop.[41] In the light of the aforementioned advantages accruing to the "Socialist sector," and considering the fact that in Bulgaria the "Socialist sector" is concentrated in the fertile valleys (See Chart IX), this division is not altogether surprising. The proportion of marketed grain derived from the "Socialist sector" is greater than its arable land, and almost as much greater as that which the USSR achieved when approximately half of its arable land was collectivized.[42] It should be noted, however, that, as in the USSR, the modest success of the "Socialist sector" as a grain producer was achieved at the cost of neglecting animal husbandry, since a high percentage of the nation's livestock remained in the private sector. But if the "Socialist sector" neglected animal husbandry, it emphasized a few semi-

[39] *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 25.
[40] *Part i Kredit* (Sofia), No. 2, 1948, p. 8.
[41] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, (Sofia) February 26, 1953.
[42] In the Soviet Union in 1932, 66 per cent of the arable land was in the "Socialist sector"; and it supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain. (Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, New York, 1948, p. 249).

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CHAPTER V

OLD FAILURE AND NEW COURSE (1953)

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178 1. *The System in Crisis*

● 66 The year 1953 constituted a major turning point in the development of agricultural policy throughout the Soviet sphere. Repercussions were felt from the most remote *kolkhoz* in Siberia to the most backward mountain farm in Albania. For the first time since 1928, when the initial Communist collectivization drive was launched, the powerful Communist mechanism for intensifying exploitation of the peasantry was halted and a period of concession, retrenchment, and cautious retreat was ushered in.

Unlike previous pauses in the Communist offensive against the peasantry — in 1930, 1935, and 1941-5 — the 1953 "readjustment" was acompanied by a revaluation of the entire relationship between agrarian policy and industrial expansion. The 1930 Stalin "Dizziness With Success" speech signified only a temporary pause in the first Five Year Plan; the 1935 decree enlarging private household plots represented only a slight reorganization of the still fluid *kolkhoz* structure; and the relaxation of 1941-45 was due largely to the special exigencies of World War II. None of the concessions made during these periods (with the possible exception of the wartime years) were as broad in scope as those of 1953; and none were offered as an integral part of a concern for mounting disproportions afflicting the entire economic life.

The elaboration of post-Stalin agricultural policies serves not merely as a climax to the indictment of the Communist land program, but as a sharp cleavage in the history of collectivization through which its inner character might be most acutely analyzed. This study has therefore, drawn heavily upon the flood of frank speeches made by Communist leaders in the second half of 1953. Their candor, like the correspondence which attended the Tito-Stalin

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dispute in 1948, illumine areas of conflict and difficulty hitherto only guessed at. 185 198

The causes of agricultural retrenchment were various and a full exploration of them is not appropriate here. But from the multiplicity of probable causes, two basic facts may be singled out: First, the poltical readjustment which took place following Stalin's death brought about a number of organic changes in the Communist movement. The precise nature of the changes generated by the sudden loss of Stalin is little known, and even less understood; but clearly they had very important social and economic implications. Some of the most oppressive and aggressive features of Communism, feasible when Stalin was at the helm, were evidently not feasible when in the hands of a "collective leadership." Stalinist policies had resulted in the growing economic disproportions described above: the hysterical drive for industrialization, the steady decline of the standard of living, and the stagnation of agriculture, conditions which may be considered the secondary causes of the New Course, insofar as the death of Stalin made it imperative that drastic steps be taken to alter them. 656

To the very eve of the New Course in 1953, the traditional Stalinist agricultural offensive was in full swing. Indeed, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and especially in Poland, collectivization drives were reaching their greatest pitch in the spring of 1953. The slogan, "liquidation of the kulaks," was generally accepted, and the entire peasantry subjected to ceaseless harassment. In the Soviet Union the decline of livestock population between 1950 and 1953 reflected the harsh spirit of the last years of Stalin's life. The basic measure of success was heavy industrial production; the keynote was the increasing obedience and discipline demanded at the 19th Party Congress; and the tone was set by the Slansky trial in Prague at the end of 1952, and the arrest of the Kremlin doctors in Moscow at the beginning of 1953.

The New Course therefore represented a sudden break in the rising curve revealed by these events. Between Stalin's death in March and Imre Nagy's astounding New Course address in Hungary in July, the governments of almost every Communist country made various minor concessions which presaged the more drastic

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[1] For a detailed exposition of the events of 1953 leading up to promulgation of the New Course, together with an analysis of current trends, see "New Policies in the Soviet Sphere" (Free Europe Press: New York, November 1953).

185 178 656 reforms to come. Amnesties were declared in Soviet Russia and Romania, the imprisoned American correspondent, William Oatis, was released in Czechoslovakia, the aggressive anti-Tito line of the preceding years was modified everywhere, and in East Germany reforms were announced which, because they communicated regime indecision to the people, touched off the famous June 17th revolt. This revolt, and an earlier, perhaps more significant one in Czechoslovakia, seem only to have accelerated the pace of change in the sphere. By October 1953 New Course policies had been announced by all of the Communist countries (with the exception, of course, of China). "We must note, and we must state frankly before the whole country," said the new Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy, "that the objectives of the augmented Five Year Plan are beyond our strength"[2] "We must adopt . . . a considerably reduced tempo of industrialization which will enable us to step up output of consumer goods and ensure a still greater development of agriculture," the Bulgarian Premier Vulko Chervenkov said on September 8th.[3] "It has become clear," said Czechoslovak Premier Viliam Siroky on September 15th, "that certain targets of the extended Five-Year Plan for heavy industry were too high."[4]

The agricultural policy pattern that emerged in the middle of 1953 varied from one country of the Soviet sphere to the next. Yet everywhere, with the possible exception of Hungary, where the crisis assumed a special severity, the new policies were essentially the same. Polish Premier Bierut explained in his New Course address in October that it was:

> . . . no mere coincidence that the . . . problem of what the emphasis of our future economic development should be . . . has appeared today with equal force and timeliness in all countries of the Socialist camp.

These similarities in pace and timing, he explained, arise,

> not only from the identical character of social changes taking place in these countries but also from the basic similarity — in spite of certain differences — in the class structure of the countries which are engaged in Socialist construction.[5]

The "social changes" of which Bierut spoke were the growing economic disproportions, the vast expansion of an industrial plant at the expense of living standards and agricultural prosperity. The

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[2] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), July 5, 1953.
[3] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), September 9, 1953.
[4] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16, 1953.
[5] Quoted by S. Jedrychowski, *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1953.

"problem" the New Course had to grapple with, as Bierut stated it, was to determine "what the emphasis of our future economic development should be." Clearly the "problem" could only be solved by modifying past emphases, and this meant, first of all, a new policy toward agriculture.

In Bulgaria, where over half the land is in the "Socialist sector," the New Course has had the least impact; in East Germany, on the other hand, where capitalist elements are still plentiful, the post-Stalin reorientation had its most pronounced effect. In Poland, where collectivization had proceeded very slowly and cautiously up to 1953, the New Course signified only an abrupt halt in the land offensive, but little retreat. In Romania, where collectivization had also been modest in scope, the reforms were broader, producing a plethora of decrees and resolutions. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where the pace of collectivization had been rapid and stormy, the New Course brought about a reversal of the aggressive policies, a sharp reversal in Hungary, a slighter one in Czechoslovakia.

The national variations were great; but the basic features of the New Course were areawide:

1. An attempt is being made to increase the proportion of national resources alloted to agriculture. "We must teach our people," said Polish theoretician Jacob Berman, "after this long period of concentration on heavy industry, to achieve a balance between heavy and light industry."[6] The State budgets for the year 1954 announced in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary reflected this shift in emphasis.[7]

2. The effort to increase the agricultural produce available to the cities by further peasant exploitation has been halted. Greater emphasis is to be placed upon the use of material incentives, rather than on administrative pressure, in increasing total agricultural yield. "We must," said Berman, "put on the market goods which the peasant is interested in purchasing," since, as he explained, the increased supply of goods for the cities was to be partially the result of an "increased supply of consumer goods to the countryside."[8]

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[6] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.
[7] In Hungary, for example, the 1954 State budget plans for doubling the proportion of total investment allocated to agriculture (Report of Bela Szalai to the Hungarian National Assembly, January 22, 1954). Elsewhere, the increase is more modest but nevertheless significant.
[8] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.

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3. Consequently, the policy of collectivization, designed to insure a steady supply of goods to the cities without much payment in return, loses a large part of its meaning, and the collectivization drive itself is halted. While it is true that collectivized farming is still officially considered the highest form of agrarian organization,[9] the revised economic plans of the Satellite regimes do not intend appreciable extension of the "Socialist sector." Indeed, the goal of increasing the standard of living precludes, for some time, the resumption of any Communist land offensive.

4. Similarly, the New Course has made something of an anomaly of the traditional practices of the Communist land offensive: the division of the peasantry into antagonistic groups, the discrimination against the independent peasantry as a whole, the compilation of "kulak lists." These techniques, which were so well adapted to the collectivization campaign, lose much of their meaning in the new atmosphere. Again and again Communist leaders admonish their bureaucracy to cease treating the peasant as an "enemy" and everywhere but in Bulgaria it is now openly declared that the independent peasantry must be relied upon for the major portion of the agricultural produce.[10] Violent anti-kulak campaigns must also be relinquished as long as the regimes are interested in agricultural production and not merely in agricultural redistribution. Therefore, the post-Stalin regimes call for "limitation" of the "kulak" rather than his "elimination."[11]

5. Since increased agricultural production is the urgent and immediate necessity, and since increased administrative force cannot be used to obtain it, incentives for the peasant must be broadened. Delivery quotas are reduced; delivery prices are increased; taxes and fees of all sorts are lowered; and arrears in many categories are canceled. The pattern is nowhere identical; but in each country most of the same devices were employed.

"We must understand," said Berman, [that the new policy] "is going to cost a large sum of money. If the peasant gets this money but doesn't get any goods for it, including those which he

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[9] See, for example, the Bierut speech at the 2nd Congress of the Polish Workers Party (PZPR), March 10, 1954.

[10] "We shall not and must not force anybody to join agricultural cooperatives, and we also do not think that the private farmer represents our enemy, we consider him our ally" (Czechoslovak President Antonin Zapotocky, *Rude Pravo*, February 23, 1954).

[11] See, for example, Gheorghiu-Dej, *For a Lasting Peace*, November 6, 1953.

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really wants . . . there will be no increase in [agricultural] production." Therefore, a dual policy of increased payment for agricultural goods and increased production of vitally needed farmers' commodities is instituted.

6. An attempt is being made to redress the balance so far as the concentration of techniques is concerned. A vigorous effort to detach technicians from cities and urban industries and to send them to farms for whose direction and assistance they were ostensibly trained, is being made in conjunction with the new plan.[12] This is true everywhere in the Soviet sphere, especially in Poland the USSR, and Romania.

7. If the New Course is designed partly to consolidate the existing agricultural structure, it must be revaluated in terms of long-range perspectives. Hence, those collective farms which have the least social stability and economic viability are permitted to return to the private sector. In Czechoslovakia, where some 40 per cent of the farms were not paying their own way, according to Premier Siroky, a small percentage of the farms were permitted to disband in the fall of 1953.[13] In Yugoslavia, where hundreds of collectives in mountainous areas produced very little and served only as a drain on the State treasury, almost half of these farms have been dissolved since 1951.[14] And in Hungary, where peasant dissatisfaction was so great that, even with a police-State normally equipped to handle discontent, it constituted an element of such basic instability that almost half of the collectivized households have left the "Socialist sector."[15]

Above all, the New Course represents an effort to stabilize and consolidate the system of relationships carved out by the East European regimes. The next few years are likely to witness a concentrated Communist effort to make a smoothly-functioning economic order out of the conquests already gained, rather than sweeping away present problems by posing future challenges, as they have done in the past.

The New Course does not, by any stretch of the imagination,

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[12] The program of reinforcing the technical assistance to the countryside has encountered considerable resistance from the technicians themselves, and, indeed, in the USSR, the government complains that many technicians who go to the countryside refuse to take their families with them, so convinced are they that the new assignments are temporary (*Pravda*, November 27, 1953).
[13] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), November 10, 1953.
[14] *Borba* (Belgrade), February 29, 1953.
[15] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), December 31, 1953.

represent a repudiation of the agricultural organization pioneered by the Soviet planners in the early 1930s and brought to Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. The basic characteristics of this organization cannot be abandoned without the most thoroughgoing reorientation of the whole economy. The New Course cannot therefore be compared with the New Economic Policy of early Soviet history. The NEP was declared before the Soviet industrial and bureaucratic system had been built, and a retreat to a relatively free market system was possible. The New Course, on the other hand, has been promulgated within the framework of an already fully-elaborated industrial and bureaucratic system, and the regimes can no longer rely upon the free market for agricultural produce.

Having built this social system and enclosed themselves within it, the East European Communists have lost much of the freedom of choice and flexibility which aided them so greatly in their post-war assumption of power. Therefore, they are subject to the internal laws of the system, and it is doubtful whether they can make a success of their efforts to reorient its basic relationships. The authoritarian order is well adapted to the leadership of a rapidly expanding heavy industrial, semi-military economy, but it is badly equipped to handle the problems of small-scale agriculture and consumer demand. In nine months of operation, the New Course has already made it clear that the greatest obstacle to stabilization of the Stalinist social order comes from the social order itself, and its voracious demands.[16]

Prior to the introduction of the New Course, it was widely assumed that the East European Communist drive to emulate Soviet achievements was inexorable, and required only time for completion. In particular, it was assumed that the Satellite regimes could not rest until collectivization was completed, as if the Communists could not face themselves ideologically with one independent farm remaining. But the events of 1953 have highlighted the degree to which Communist agricultural policy has been, from the start, conditioned by the bedrock economic needs of a developing social structure, rather than by the abstract demands of rigid doctrine. Indeed, even the Soviets, whose collectivized agriculture had attained the state of "near-perfection" and completion toward which

[16] For an extensive discussion of internal bureaucratic resistance to the New Course see "The Bureaucracy Wavers," *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press, New York), January, 1953.

the East European Communists were striving, are in the process of readjusting the structure in line with the new political relationships.

No doubt the present *modus vivendi* between the peasantry and the Communist regimes is precarious and unstable, at best an uneasy truce between essentially antagonistic social forces. But there is good reason to believe that the Communists are determined to keep this mid-way course for some time to come, with only minor wavering within the ranks.

3. *"Salami Tactics" and the New Course*

The development of East European Communism since World War II has been dominated by the pragmatic methods of "salami tactics," the theory expounded by Hungarian ex-Premier Rakosi, which justified pursuit of any social or economic program that reinforces Communist political power. The advocacy of land reform facilitated Communist absorption of the State machine in 1945-46, and therefore became approved Communist "agrarian policy." Similarly, since advocacy of a productive middle peasantry may help to facilitate Communist retention of power in 1953-54, it has become approved Communist "agrarian policy." At each stage, the Communists speak as if no other policy had ever been considered, and as if no other policy could possibly be.[17] As always, however, their primary concern is with power, and their ideological pronouncements tailored to suit it. The New Course is a development very much within the spirit of the "salami tactics" philosophy.

The success and failure of Communist agriculture policy in Eastern Europe may be attributable to these same "salami tactics." This strategem of slow suffocation made possible the seizure of power under circumstances unsuited to "classic" revolutionary forms; and it was well suited to a political apparatus incapable of a frontal revolutionary attack. The policy of slow, piecemeal land collectivization made possible the extension of the "Socialist sector" at a pace which did not arouse the united antagonism of the peasantry at any one time, thus avoiding the type of militant resist-

[17] See above 91-2 for a brief discussion of official explanations of change in policy. Considering the importance of changes in policy emphasis in 1953, it is remarkable that the Communists have made so few attempts to analyze their past performances. The official definition of "Socialism" itself was altered during 1953 (see Fogarasi, *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), September-October, 1953), and to this date not a single Communist theoretician has acknowledged the fact.

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War II were the least, and ending with those in which the changes were the greatest. This order illustrates the course of historical development, since the countries in which the changes were very small after World War II were those in which the greatest changes had been wrought in the past, and those where big changes took place had known but few before.

Bulgaria

The national uprising of the Bulgarians in 1878 destroyed feudalism. The Turkish beys fled for their lives and left the Bulgarian serfs in full and free ownership of the land they tilled. The few feudal remnants that were not eliminated in 1878 were swept away by the Agrarian Union Government of Alexander Stamboliisky (1920–23). This government fixed a maximum of 30 hectares of land for any one household (i.e., an area smaller than that fixed as a maximum by the land reforms in any country except Bulgaria herself after World War II). The political instability of this government, ending in its overthrow by a military *coup d'état* and the murder of its leader as well as of tens of thousands of peasants and workers, resulted in the law of the maximum not being fully applied, so that a certain concentration of ownership took place after 1923. Nevertheless, Bulgaria remained a country with very few 'estates' of more than 30 hectares, a country of small peasant ownership par excellence:

LAND OWNERSHIP IN BULGARIA BEFORE THE 1944 REFORM
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	*Below 5 ha.**	*5-10 ha.*	*10-30 ha.*	*30-50 ha.*	*50 ha. and over*
Number of Owners	63.1	26.2	10.3	0.3	0.1
Area	30.0	36.9	29.5	2.0	1.6

(L. Bojkoff, *Bulgaria is not the Land of Roses Only*, Sofia, 1946, p. 69.)

Wilbert E. Moore, in *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (League of Nations, Geneva, 1945), gives an even lower percentage for the big properties: in 1934 only 2.7 per cent of the land was in the hands of people owning more than 30 hectares each (p. 251).

There were very few tenants in Bulgaria. According to an official report of 31st December, 1926, the cultivated rented

*ha. = hectare = 2.4711 acres.

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land comprised only 1 per cent of all privately owned land. 423
(O. S. Morgan, editor, *Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe. A Symposium*, New York, 1933, p. 50). The number of agricultural workers was also negligible.

After World War II the Communist government fixed a new [656] ●
maximum of 20 ha. for all parts of the country except Dobrudja where the maximum fixed by Stamboliisky was in force. But although the government hoped to increase its influence among the peasants, the real results of this land reform were not considerable. In his Report to the Second Fatherland Front Congress (Feb. 2-3, 1948) Premier Georgi Dimitrov said that '127,000 families received 1,258,000 decares of land (1 decare = 1/10 hectare—Y.G.) in compliance with the agrarian reform, while 7,863 families were housed and given about 12,000 decares of land. 71,000 decares of land were distributed among 381 State farms, establishments and institutions'. (*Second Fatherland Front Congress*, Sofia, 1948, p. 42). Thus altogether 1,341,000 decares, or 134,100 hectares, were distributed. Since the total arable land in 1947 was 7.8 million hectares, the redistribution was relatively small. The land reform affected only about three per cent of the agricultural land.

The limited extent of the last land reform in Bulgaria is shown by the statistics of land ownership before and after it:

	Cultivated Land (in Percentage)		
	1926	1934	1946
Small farms	28.62	28.90	30.70
Medium „	41.63	41.13	40.60
Large „	29.75	29.97	28.70

Professor Petko Spirkov, who cites this table, draws the obvious conclusion from it: ' . . . during the period 1926-1946 there are practically no changes in the distribution of land'. ('Class Structure of our Village,' *Free Bulgaria*, Sofia, March 15, 1949).

Yugoslavia

Serbia achieved virtual national independence in 1830 and full sovereignty in 1877. Then the Turkish feudal lords fled from the country and as in Bulgaria the land remained the property of the former serfs, so that many years before World

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423 Up to September, 1947, land reform affected about 1.4 million hectares, and afterwards, with the distribution of the royal estates, etc., altogether 1.6 million hectares, i.e., about 10 per cent of the agricultural area of Rumania, or a third of the relative extent of the land reform after World War I.

Czechoslovakia

423 563 ●656 As a result of the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) the Czech nobility was almost completely wiped out and replaced by German Catholic landlords. Thus, when the Czechoslovak Republic was established, there were German landlords and Czech peasants in the Czech areas, and in the Sudetenland—the Border area — mainly German peasants and German landlords. In Slovakia (taken from the Hungarian part of the Hapsburg Empire) there were Magyar landlords and Slovak peasants, and, in the region bordering on Hungary, Hungarian peasants and Hungarian landlords. So that here, the land question and the national question were one, as in other parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire: Magyar landlords exploited Slovak, Rumanian, Croat and Ruthenian peasants; German landlords exploited Czech, Ruthenian, Slovene and Polish peasants.

In 1919 the Land Reform Act was passed. It provided for the dividing up of all large estates of more than 100 hectares. But this law was only partially and half-heartedly carried out. Yet, as a result of the land reform, 1.7 million hectares, or 12 per cent of the area of Czechoslovakia, were expropriated, and by 1 January, 1937, 1,272,934 hectares had been redistributed. At the same time in 1930, 13.8 per cent of the agricultural area still remained in properties of over 100 hectares. It was mainly Hungarian and German landlords who were expropriated, but the German and Hungarian peasants, tenants and agricultural workers not only were not excluded, but even benefited from the redistribution. As Miss L. E. Texter writes: 'The German farmer received land even from a Czech landowner'. (*Land Reform in Czechoslovakia*, London, 1923, quoted by E. Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, London, 1938, p. 152).

In 1945 (as a result of the decrees of 19.5.45, 21.6.45, 20.7.45 and 3.9.45) an area of 2.6 million hectares was taken from Germans, landlords and peasants alike. Practically no

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land belonging to non-Germans was touched in Bohemia and Moravia. As a result of the agrarian reform in Slovakia, three hundred thousand hectares were expropriated, of which two-thirds belonged to Hungarians and Germans.

For two years the property of Czech and Slovak landowners was left untouched by the government. Land reform was identified with the national struggle of all the Slavs—Czechs and Slovaks alike—against all the Germans and Hungarians.

Later on it was necessary to reduce the maximum holding in order to pave the way for the total annihilation of the bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia, and the integration of Czechoslovakia in the Russian Empire. On July 11, 1947, the maximum of 100 hectares fixed in 1919 was reduced to 50 hectares, and as a result another 919 thousand hectares were redistributed.

Thus until July, 1947, land redistribution was aimed at achieving an internal colonisation by the expropriation of 'foreign' proprietors, and the extent of the second wave of land redistribution was only about a quarter of the first.

Poland

After the First World War, Polish governments carried out, if somewhat timidly, certain land reforms. A maximum holding of 180 hectares of arable land was fixed with two exceptions—in suburbs the area allowed to a household was 60 hectares and in the Eastern districts it was 300 hectares. The landlords in the Eastern districts were treated gently because their peasants belonged to the national minorities—Ukrainians and White Russians. The administration was empowered to decide annually what estates should be divided. In fact, Polish landlords were able, by pulling strings, to escape the land reform, and in general only the estates of Russian landlords in Eastern Poland were redistributed. Altogether between 1919 and 1938, 2,654,000 hectares were divided up. (F. Zweig, *Poland between Two Wars*, London, 1944, p. 133).

In spite of this measure of land reform, a not inconsiderable proportion of land remained in the hands of big landowners. In 1931, about 4.6 million hectares, 18.0 per cent of all agricultural land, belonged to farms of more than 50 hectares. But as a single owner might own several farms, each of less than 50 hectares but totalling more than 50 hectares, the area

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423 comprised by properties over 50 hectares after the land reform was even greater than 4.6 million hectares. The lack of statistics on the subject (resulting from the Polish government's attempt to gloss over the reactionary and half-hearted way in which the land distribution was carried out) makes it impossible to estimate more exactly what area was covered by properties of more than 50 hectares. It is, however, evident that the redistribution of land carried out between the two world wars affected 2.6 million hectares, and left about twice that area untouched.

The frontier alterations resulting from World War II fundamentally changed property relations. Eastern Poland, an area of big estates, was lost to Poland, and a new area was gained in the west which—after the expulsion of 8.5 million Germans—was only very sparsely populated.

● 656 By the decrees of 6 September, 1944, and 17 January, 1945,
423 all Germans and traitors were expropriated, and 50 hectares of arable land was fixed as a maximum individual holding in Old Poland and 100 hectares in the 'Regained Territories'. The Church land was not affected. Polish landlords who had more than 50 hectares received very little compensation for the area they ceded—the equivalent of one year's yield of grain. According to the terms of these decrees, in Old Poland the area to be redistributed was more than 3 million hectares, of which agricultural land (excluding forests) made up 2,131,285 hectares. About 1,256,000 hectares of this belonged to Polish landlords, and 875,000 hectares belonged to Germans. In the Western Territories more than 5 million hectares of agricultural land was taken from Germans and either distributed to Polish peasants (4.5 million) or converted into state farms, agricultural schools, etc.

Thus internal colonization, or expropriation on a nationalist basis, is the key to the change in land ownership in Poland, even more than in Czecholslovakia.

Hungary

423 Unlike her neighbours, Hungary did not undergo any land reform after World War I. The communist government of Béla Kun (1919) did not divide the large estates among the peasants —one of their serious mistakes which made the victory of the

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White Terror easier. If the land had been divided, it would have remained peasant property even after Béla Kun had been overthrown. No power on earth could have changed this. But by a paradox of history, the only country of Eastern and South Eastern Europe that had a Communist government at that period was the only one in which the feudal land structure remained intact. 423

The pattern of land distribution in Hungary is revealed by the following table:

DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDINGS ACCORDING TO AREA, 1930

Groups of holdings according to area	*Number of Farms*		*Total Area*		*Average area of holdings*
	Thousands	*% of total*	*Thousands of yokes**	*% of total*	*yokes*
Up to 1 yoke	552	34.5	287	1.8	0.52
1-2 yokes	278	17.4	428	2.7	1.54
2-5 „	313	19.6	1,034	6.5	3.30
5-10 „	200	12.5	1,460	9.2	7.30
10-20 „	157	9.8	2,241	14.0	14.27
20-100 „	84	5.3	3,093	19.4	36.82
100 and more yokes	14	0.9	7,390	46.4	527.88
Total	1,598	100	15,933	100	10.00

(International Agrarian Institute, *Six Years of the Agrarian Crisis*, Moscow, 1935, p. 109)

Thus, on the one hand there were 1,143,000 lilliputian holdings (71.5 per cent of all the farms), each less than 5 yokes, making up 11.0 per cent of the total area, and on the other hand, 14,000 large estates (0.9 per cent of all the farms), making up 46.4 per cent of the area.

After World War II the time was overripe for the abolition of large estates oppressing the mass of agricultural workers and tenants.

On 17th March, 1945, the Hungarian government passed a law confiscating the land of gentry with estates of more than 50 hectares, as well as the estates of the Church bodies of more than 50 hectares, and of peasant land over 100 hectares. The maximum individual land holding was fixed at 100 hectares, except for those who distinguished themselves in the war against Germany, in which case the maximum was 150 hectares. The so-called 'model farms', that is, vineyards, orchards and other intensive cultures, were exempt from redistribution. As a result, an area of 5.7 million yokes,† i.e., 423 656

*yoke = 0.575 hectares = 1.422 acres

†Of this area, only 456 thousand yokes were expropriated from Germans who were expelled from the country. The rest was the property of big Hungarian landlords.

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423 more than a third of all the cultivated land of Hungary, was
● 656 distributed among 640,000 families. Thus in Hungary there was a real revolution in agricultural property relations.

To sum up the changes in land ownership brought about
423 since the end of World War II: in Hungary the transformation of property relations in land by the elimination of large estates was tremendous, and a progressive step; the land reform in Rumania, which was the completion of a much wider land reform after World War I, was less extensive but of the same character; in Czechoslovakia and Poland the changes constituted in the main an act of internal colonisation and of the expropriation of millions of Germans and Hungarians; in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the changes were very small indeed.

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465 standard. In summing up, the article states: 'The public
511 administration swallows 48 per cent of the national income.
434 How will it be possible to raise the standard of living of the
● 656 whole people, how will the wide layers of the toilers be satisfied, how will it be possible to pay proper salaries to government clerks?' (From an article, 'Let us think about the Figures', quoted by V. Salus in the theoretical paper of the Czech Social Democracy, *Cil*, August 15th, 1947, under the interesting heading, 'Economic Democracy and the New Nobility').*

511 The division of the national income in Yugoslavia is not less
565 unequal than in the other 'People's Democracies.' Vernon
434 Bartlett, when in Belgrade, described the situation in the

*For a time the Communist Party leaders tried to cushion the conflict between the workers and the 'new nobility' by directing the hostility of the masses exclusively against the bourgeoisie. For example in October, 1947, in connection with the relief to the peasants who were suffering from the drought, the Communist Party raised the slogan 'Let the millionaires pay', and proposed as a solution the imposition of a property levy. Of course the bureaucracy, being 'propertyless—in form' would not have to pay anything. The Communist Party tried to overlook the fact that the portion of the national income of Czechoslovakia in the hands of the bourgeoisie was so small, only a quarter of industry being left in their hands, that the only possibility of seriously improving the conditions of the masses was by 1. cutting into the income of the bureaucracy; 2. raising the general national income; 3. preventing Russia from taking her cut from the national income.

The Communist Party claimed that there were 35,000 millionaires in Czechoslovakia. This is a large number, but it is much less impressive when it is realised that they were not pound sterling or dollar millionaires, but crown millionaires. A million crowns in July, 1947, was equal to five thousand pounds sterling. Even according to the Communist Party estimate the wealth of these 35,000 'millionaires' was only 50 milliard (According to the bourgeois paper *Svobodné Slovo* there were only 12,000 millionaires with a property of 22 milliard crowns). 50 milliard crowns is only about a quarter of the *annual national income* of Czechoslovakia.

The conditions of the masses could not therefore be substantially improved at the expense of the bourgeoisie, but only by improvements in the nationalised sectors of the economy and at the expense of the bureaucracy. This is proved by the distribution of the national income:

Personal Income at Factor Cost (thousand million of crowns.)	1947
1. Entrepreneural profits in industry, trade and professions and private income from capital	22.0
2. Rentals and sub-rentals (including net rental value of owner-occupied dewllings	5.2
3. Independent agriculturists	25.4
4. Wages and salaries	125.9
5. Pensions of Government employees	5.7
6. Unfreezing of blocked accounts to people of limited means	6.3

In addition there were a number of other small items.

(Statistical Office of the United Nations, *National Income Statistics of Various Countries, 1938-1948*, Lake Success, New York, 1950, p. 59).

The figures speak for themselves. The possibility of increasing item 4 at the expense of item 1 is very limited indeed:

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661 These are just a few of the victims. Altogether in the big purge of 1937 the whole or the majority of thirty national governments were liquidated. The main accusation against them was their desire for secession from the U.S.S.R.

The fact that the N.K.V.D. directed from Moscow can arrest heads of governments, Commissars (now called Ministers), first secretaries of the Party in the national republics and a host of lesser figures, shows that the much-vaunted independence of the national republics is purely formal. Nothing remains of the right of secession, even though this is recognised in the Stalin Constitution (Article 17). As early as the twelfth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (1923) Ukrainian communists who demanded that control over the G.P.U. in the different republics be vested in the national governments, were severely rebuked.

661 656 563 The most important element of the administration of the state besides the police is the army, but the national republics have no separate armies of their own. They are not even allowed to keep their own soldiers within their own borders, but armies composed mostly of other nationals camp on their territories. The story of the Ukrainian army is typical. This army won its laurels during the Civil War in 1918-21, when, almost single-handed, it liberated Ukraine from the Whites. It continued to camp in Ukraine until 1929. But the Great Russian bureaucracy, becoming afraid of the strength of this peasant army, decided to cripple it permanently. The army was broken up, its separate units moved from the Ukraine and dispersed all over the U.S.S.R. It was replaced in Ukraine by a Great Russian army commanded from Moscow, to ensure the complete dependence of Ukraine on Moscow. The same fate befell the other national republics.

The Communist Parties in the republics are not only directed from Moscow, but even the majority of those they appoint to the State or Party apparatus are Great Russians. Nearly all the First Secretaries of the Ukrainian Communist Party came from Moscow: Kaganovich, Postyshev, Kosior, Khrushchev, and Kaganovich once more. Of the five First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the Central Asiatic Republics today, four are Russians, and the position in the other republics is similar. Even where the secretaries are drawn from the local

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661 population, they are so dependent on the centralised Party
652 machine and the N.K.V.D. that they are nothing but local
523 quislings.

646 A study of the national composition of the Supreme Soviet
661 of the U.S.S.R. gives a clear picture of the subordination of the non-Russian peoples. Vs. Felix and Ju. Snov made an interesting analysis in the Ukrainian Socialist review, *Vpered* (Munich, 1950, No. 3), using as their basis the list of M.P.'s published in *Pravda* on 15th March, 1950. Of the 25 deputies every republic sent to the Soviet of Nationalities, 5 from Ukraine S.S.R. were Russians, 4 from Uzbek S.S.R., 6 from Kazakh S.S.R., 5 from Lithuanian S.S.R., 6 from Latvian S.S.R., 5 from Tadjik S.S.R. and 6 from Kirghiz S.S.R. Actually, these Russians hold the key positions in the administration of the republics. For instance, of the 5 Russian deputies from the Tadjik S.S.R., two were D. K. Vishnevski, who is the Minister of State Security (M.G.B.) for Tadjikistan, and A. V. Kharchenko, who is the Minister of the Interior (M.V.D.) for Tadjikistan.

661 The overriding control of Moscow over the administration
652 of the national republics explains the complete defeat of all the
523 national resistance movements hitherto. It also explains the defeat of the 'Titoists' in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Tito has been successful so far because Moscow never controlled the state apparatus of Yugoslavia. She was 'liberated' not by the Soviet Army but by her own National Liberation Army, organised and led by Yugoslavs.

197 The cultural life of the various nations is also subjected to
652 Russification. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they
523 introduced the Latin alphabet for the many nations in Russia which had no written language at all, and 71 written languages in this form were introduced. This was considered the simplest and most progressive means of promoting the cultural development of these people, and it underlined the fact that there was no intention of Russification. Stalin reversed this progressive policy. In 1936, the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Cyrillic, which is much more complicated, and in 1938 Russian was made a compulsory language in all Secondary schools of the U.S.S.R.

Even more important than the language people speak or write is what they speak or write.

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The direction of people's minds along the groove required by Moscow begins at school. Pupils in Ukraine are made to pay tribute to Kutuzov, known as the hangman of the Ukrainians. Chmelnitzki, who massacred the Jews and betrayed the Ukrainian peasants into Russian serfdom must be acclaimed a national hero. Pupils in Azerbaidjan must be taught that the Russian occupation of their country in 1806 was not symbolic of the superiority of Russian arms alone, but shows the long attachment of Azerbaidjan to Russian culture. It is often very difficult for the non-Russian scholars to explain their history in the way required, and they are frequently accused of nationalism. In the summer of 1944, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. severely criticized the cultural work of the Tartar Republic, its main defalcation being nationalist falsifications in the teaching of its national history. The Tartars were instructed to emphasize the elements in their history which united them with Russia (*Propagandist*, 15th June, 1944). The journal *Kultura i Zhizn* of 30th November, 1945, is devoted mainly to criticisms of 'nationalist deviations' in the teaching of history. The institutes of history in the Ukrainian, Tartar, Bashkir, Armenian, Georgian, Latvian and White Russian Republics all come in for their measure of stern criticism.

The war proved a great test for Stalin's national policy. The fact that the soldiers of the U.S.S.R. fought with great courage proves nothing by itself. Russia's greatest military victories in the eighteenth century were won by Suvorov in Catherine the Great's reign, the worst period of serfdom. The serfs who were so cruelly exploited showed immense heroism and self-sacrifice in the army. In the Second World War the German and Japanese soldiers doggedly persisted in their struggle even when all hope of military victory was lost, but this fact does not prove that there were harmonious social relations within these countries.

It is extremely difficult to discover the whole truth about the number of quislings in Russia. The case of General Vlassov is well known. He received the highest orders of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, but on being taken prisoner by the Germans, organised an army of between 100,000 and 1,000,000 prisoners of war from the U.S.S.R. to fight by the side of the Germans. This by itself, however, indicated very little. Hitler,

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The strongest proof that Russia's national policy does not create harmonious and fraternal relations between the different peoples is the dissolution of a number of national republics. A year before the war, when there was tension between Russia and Japan on the Manchurian border, the *entire* Korean population on the Russian side of the border was transferred to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.

On 28th August, 1941, the entire population of the Volga German Republic was transferred East of the Urals. The German Republic was one of the oldest national republics of Russia. As early as 19th October, 1918, the Workers' Commune of Volga Germans was constituted, and on 19th December, 1923, it was reconstituted as the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Volga Germans. It was one of the first republics to achieve almost complete collectivisation. *International Press Correspondence* of 18th April, 1936, said: 'The German Soviet Republic on the Volga is a living proof of the cultural and national progress which follows on the victory of socialism and a living disproof of the lies and slanders spread by the fascist enemies of the proletariat'. Just two years before their expulsion, an article appeared in *Moscow News* called: 'Volga German Republic, a Vivid Illustration of Soviet National Policy in Practice'. Then, after the Volga Germans had for so many years been commended for the unanimous support of the regime, came the decree of the dissolution of their republic, with the following explanation: 'According to reliable information received by military authorities, there are thousands and tens of thousands of diversionists and spies among the German population of the Volga region who are prepared to cause explosions in these regions at a signal from Germany. No Germans (living in the Volga districts—Y.G.) ever reported to Soviet authorities the presence of such great numbers of diversionists and spies. Therefore, the German population of the Volga regions are covering up enemies of the Soviet people and the Soviet power.'

In the areas of the U.S.S.R. formerly occupied by the Germans a number of republics were dissolved. These dissolutions were not even mentioned in the press, and it was only when *Pravda* on 17th October, 1945, gave a list of the constituencies for the coming general elections, that it was

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discovered that a number of republics had disappeared, since when one cannot know: the autonomous Crimean Tartar, Kalmyk and Checheno-Ingush Soviet Republics and the autonomous Karachev region were abolished and the non-Russian populations deported.

In Ukraine, Khrushchev, head of the government, declared in August, 1946, that half the leading personalities of the Ukrainian Party had been expelled in the previous eighteen months. It would be too much even for the Great Russian bureaucracy to expel 30 million Ukrainians and dissolve their 'republic'.

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S.U.
1947 but not to the years following. The period of the New 656
Economic Policy in Russia was called "the period of a certain revival of capitalism"; in reality, it was a kind of retreat of communism from economic difficulties.

E.
In the captive countries there was no "period of revival 656
of capitalism." Since the very inception of communism, there 185
has been a systematic liquidation of all private property, 423
carried out in premeditated fashion within the limits of existing conditions and possibilities. In the beginning, the question of private property arose only in regard to small trade, dwelling houses, building, crafts, and, in a larger degree to peasant farming. Hence, the Communists advocated the principle of a three-sector economy, composed of state economy—after an immediate nationalization of medium and heavy industries, landlords' estates, and forests—of cooperative economy, and of private economy.

The fact that this period, the traces of which we still 665
find in the constitutions of the captive countries, was planned 661
from above as no more than a transitional period, is best proved by the accusation leveled against the former Communist Vice-Premier of Poland, Gomulka, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Warsaw, in 1948. Gomulka was told then that his main guilt was not that he agreed to the principles of the three-sector economy but that he acted according to these principles. It was explained to him then that he had proceeded as though he wanted to keep the system although he knew that it was transitional.

In 1947, after the falsification of the elections and the 665
destruction of the opposition of the independent peasant parties in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland, the Cominform was established and Communist policy abandoned its nationalist line and adopted the line of internationalism. A special declaration of the differences between Communist internationalism and the "cosmopoli-

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423 cause the land was becoming exhausted. This was due to a
341 lack of manure and fertilizer and to the peasants' ignorance of land preservation techniques.

[444] Labor remained so cheap that the introduction of labor-saving devices did not pay. Overpopulation meant that there were more people living on holdings than were needed for the farm work. This situation caused underemployment. Since overpopulation decreased the output per man and with it the earnings per man, a very low standard of living resulted.

423 The size of the farms, which on the average was barely
656 ten acres, was a problem in itself, and the custom of dividing
185 land after the death of a peasant made the situation even more acute. The holdings consisted of many small and scattered strips so that it was impossible for the peasant to use machines, even when they were available. However, the land reforms, carried out after the First World War by the different governments, did have some success in equalizing the amounts of land held by the different peasants.

The land reforms grew out of political and national considerations rather than out of social and economic policy. The first and main objective of the agrarian parties was to expropriate the big landowners and to transfer their land to the peasants. The usual procedure was to fix a maximum acreage, usually about five hundred acres, and to decree that all land in excess of this amount should be sold to peasants, either to create new farms or to add to the area of peasant farms already in existence. Under these reforms, about twenty-five million acres were distributed, for the most part in quite small plots, averaging one hectare, or 2.4 acres. The smaller farms were given more land than the large, so that there was some leveling of the incomes derived from farming.

162 These reforms did not remedy the unhappy condition of
464 the peasantry, since they were unable to remove the main
51 causes for distress. If all the agricultural land of this region

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and supplied him with goods. Frequently he had a strong and pernicious hold on the peasant.

Therefore, the cooperative movement began with the foundation of credit societies which formed a very large proportion of all cooperatives. Besides these, there were cooperative societies which supplied agricultural needs such as tools and seeds, traded agricultural products, and processed all sorts of produce. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania the cooperative movements were state-controlled. In Czechoslovakia the movement was independent but favored by the state; in Poland, beginning with the economic depression of the 1930's it was state-supported and therefore dependent.

The cooperative problem was a difficult one. On the one hand, cooperation among economically weak peasants could not succeed unless there was some collaboration with, or help from, the central authorities. On the other hand, such a relationship between strong and weak tended to develop into state domination of the cooperative movement.

The administrators of the cooperatives sometimes abused their prerogatives. They would occasionally grant government loans, not in response to genuine needs or because of commercial considerations, but with a view to the substantial number of votes which one cooperative society could guarantee at election time. In some instances, cooperatives served only well-to-do peasants because some governments were opposed to the social revolutionary ideology of the smaller peasants. In Rumania the cooperative societies were forced to assume the function of the tax collector. In Hungary the cooperatives belonged to the peasants in appearance only. In reality, they were capitalist enterprises and were not in peasant hands.

Except in Czechoslovakia, agricultural cooperation did not play any decisive role in the economic life of the peasantry, nor was it able to alleviate the existing adverse

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conditions. Credit was no real help unless the peasant had a reasonable expectation of being able to pay back what he had borrowed. In many cases this hope was negligible. A large proportion of the money which the peasants, particularly the small peasants, borrowed went to buy consumer goods. Thus, greater indebtedness did not point to a higher degree of investment, but to the extreme poverty of the small farm.

There was some state help for this situation, especially during the world-wide depression of the 1930's. In Bulgaria and Rumania agricultural debts were converted by government action. In 1934 some two hundred thousand Bulgarian peasants benefited by reductions in their debts and in the rate of interest and by a prolongation of the time allowed for settlement. In Rumania some two and one-half million peasants were assisted by similar legislation. Other measures, although not so far-reaching, were put into practice elsewhere in Eastern Europe to alleviate peasant indebtedness. But the credit problem was only mitigated, and not solved. The peasants' need for cash remained, and the lack of capital still prevented them from improving their farming techniques or increasing their earning capacity.

The governments promoted intensive cultivation of non-cereals. Grain production was not appropriate to an overpopulated region, and a change to the production of livestock, livestock products, fruit, and vegetables was necessary. In Bulgaria and in some parts of Yugoslavia, intensive cultivation of garden crops, such as tobacco, tomatoes, wine, fruit, and roses was introduced. In Rumania, the cultivation of soya and other oil plants was introduced. These measures were, of course, just a beginning, and could not bring any substantial remedy.

Agriculture played the most important role of any single factor in all the Eastern European countries except Czechoslovakia. The largest part of the national incomes was de-

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frontiers were another cause for great migrations. Four million Poles moved from the territory which was incorporated into the U.S.S.R., and millions of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks moved into districts formerly inhabited by the Germans. Although these changes alleviated the problem of rural overpopulation in Eastern Europe, there was still, at the end of the Second World War, a surplus population estimated at nine million.

The Communist parties in various Eastern European states knew very well how to exploit this situation. They knew that it was vital to the success of revolution that the peasantry should not be opposed to it. They knew that the Russian Revolution had been achieved only because Lenin was fully aware of the desire of the peasant for more land.

Orthodox Marxist theory required that the land be nationalized and that it be administered by the state. Land was considered the most important means of production, and it had to be treated as such. This dogma was abandoned by Lenin for tactical reasons. He nationalized land in the Soviet Union during the revolution of 1917, but distributed it under ninety-nine-year leases to small and medium peasants for private exploitation. It was the political pressure of the peasants which forced Lenin to change his political doctrine and implement the agrarian program of the Populists, his political opponents. Lenin and his followers did not approve of the peasant who, according to them, was a relic of the precapitalistic society. It was Lenin's view that "small, individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale," and that in the future classless society the peasant was to assume the status of a worker on the land as his fellow in town was a worker in industry.

Political expediency determined Lenin's change in tactics. He supported small agrarian property holders only because

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he regarded the peasant as indispensable to the success of his revolution and to the consolidation of his dictatorship. This policy was reversed by Stalin after 1928 when forced collectivization of land in the form of pseudo-cooperatives (collective farms) was introduced in the Soviet Union.

Lenin's agricultural policy was adopted by all Eastern European Communist parties after the end of the Second World War. Being minorities in power, they knew that this was the only attitude they could take to the peasantry, the largest social group in this region. Therefore, they supported small agrarian property holders in the first stage of the development of their agricultural policy. There was only one difference between the Communist agricultural policies of Eastern Europe and Russia. Nationalization of land was not a part of the Eastern European policy, as it had not proved expedient in the Soviet Union and therefore was not contained in the agrarian policy of the Comintern for Eastern Europe in the inter-war period.

The Comintern had taken much interest in the Eastern European agrarian question. In 1923 a Red Peasants International was formed in Moscow as an effort to rally the peasantry to the Communist ideal and to combat the influence of the peasant parties united in the Green International in Prague. The Soviet move to collectivization within the U.S.S.R. in 1929 was not followed by any shift in the agrarian policy of the Comintern. Any mention of collective farming was frowned upon and the whole emphasis was upon attracting or neutralizing the middle peasant by assisting the individual and by supporting with new land reforms the peasant's struggle for more land. This policy was not changed when the Cominform took over the role of the Comintern after the Second World War.

"The land to those who till it personally," was the slogan of all Eastern European Communist parties, and land reforms were carried out in all countries. In Hungary, Albania,

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and in parts of Poland, land reforms were overdue, while in other Eastern European states expropriation and expulsion of the Germans formed the main basis of land reforms. Some forty-eight million acres, including forest land, were expropriated by the governments of which thirty million acres were distributed to some three million peasant families. The remainder was retained by the state.

To dispel any doubts as to the ultimate outcome of these reforms, the distributed land was declared the private property of the new owners, and in most countries it was laid down in the constitutions that "the land belongs to those who till it." The price to be paid by the beneficiaries was low, usually the equivalent of one year's harvest payable in ten to twenty installments. No compensation was paid to the old owners for the expropriated land.

The attitude toward the church and its landed property was less uniform than toward the secular owners. However, after some hesitation, most of the church estates exceeding the maximum size laid down in the land reform laws were also expropriated. In this way the church was deprived of its financial independence and of its economic influence on the rural population.

Even in the Baltic States which were incorporated into the Soviet Union, Stalin's methods were not followed. All the land and its resources, as in Russia, were declared public property and nationalized, and all the land in excess of seventy-five acres was expropriated for distribution, but no collectives were formed. However, through a system of differential delivery and farm taxes, the way was paved for ultimate collectivization.

All these land reforms had done nothing to solve the old agricultural problem of Eastern Europe. On the contrary, they aggravated the situation. The land became more split up than ever, as larger farms were abolished. The reforms did not solve the problem of technical progress, and made the

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reorganization of agriculture even more necessary than it had been before.

Land reform was a political measure. Its aim was not the reorganization of production, but the redistribution of income. Its aim was to win the small peasant for the Communists, and to weaken the political influence of the agrarian parties. Therefore, the Communists stole the programs of the agrarian parties and publicized them as their own. Beside private ownership, these programs called for mechanization, consolidation of scattered strips, good and guaranteed prices for agricultural products, expansion of credit, reduction of taxes, and social insurance for all peasants.

The smallholders felt quite happy, generally speaking, on their new land. It may have produced less than it had in the hands of its former owners, but the smallholders' income was larger than it had been when they were employed as agricultural laborers. Many of them started believing the Communists and joined the Communist parties. One of the Communist aims was fulfilled.

IV

It should have been obvious to all that the Communists were preparing a program of land collectivization, and that the second stage of their agricultural policy would be similar to what it had been in the Soviet Union. But sufficient attention was not paid to these trends. Practically all forests and large stretches of arable land and pastures became state property and were organized as Communist state farms. District cooperative or state stations were established and equipped with heavy agricultural machinery, which was not practical for use on small fields. The Communists favored the allocation of equipment to cooperatives rather than to private persons. The cooperatives, which performed many public functions such as bulk purchasing of food and supplies, began to

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cause of the fuel shortage, makes a bitter joke of the Communist pledge to liberate the housewife from drudgery. There are a few brighter spots in this picture. The soldiers and policemen are well fed and so are the privileged classes of senior government and party workers, and of artists and writers. The numerical strength of these new, privileged strata of society is less than that of the pre-war middle class, and their standard of living is undoubtedly lower.

Data have been published lately that illustrate the low level of consumption of food behind the Iron Curtain. These data concern the increase of sales of certain staples in Czechoslovakia in 1952 over those in 1951, and, for once, they are disclosed not in meaningless percentages, as is the rule behind the Iron Curtain, but in absolute figures. An analysis of these figures shows the increase in sales of sugar and butter to the extent, respectively, of two ounces and less than half an ounce per capita per month. The alleged increase in sales of coffee actually lags behind the increase in the population. Only the amount of tea sold has really increased. However, the Czechoslovakians are not tea but coffee drinkers. They used to produce more sugar than they could consume before the war. Yet the text in question continues: "The above figures show that the standard of living of the Czechoslovak people is irresistibly on the upward trend." Another example is a long letter from a coal miner in Poland, whose only subject was a detailed description of how he tried in vain for weeks in the fall of 1952 to buy a piece of sausage. In his fury with the regime and "the Russkis" behind it, the humble writer rose to the rhetoric of a Patrick Henry and declared that since there was no sausage life was not worth living. "And to think that I actually used to grumble against the pre-war government!" was his final confession. It should be noted that pre-war Poland had a large surplus of pork.

In the summer of 1953, the Soviet government announced that it would take many measures to relieve the all too ob-

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vious shortages of consumer goods and to increase substantially the standard of living of the Soviet population. This announcement was followed by similar declarations in the captive countries. Their governments bound themselves to increase investments in agriculture, housing and light industries producing consumer goods. In Eastern Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and somewhat later in Poland, qualified promises were made to the effect that the hitherto very rapid rate of heavy industrial expansion would be slowed down. At the same time two of the greatest works under construction in the area have been interrupted if not abandoned: the Danube-Black Sea canal in Rumania and, to all appearances, the huge HUKO iron and steel 'combinat' in Eastern Slovakia. These public statements were in themselves equivalent to an official admission that the condition of the population was miserable.

Time alone will show whether, and to what extent, these new policies will be realized. The bumper 1953 harvest in most of the key provinces of the area would undoubtedly relieve its food scarcity if it were not for the fact that a great deal of this harvest has been earmarked for export. The Soviet government stated recently that it would import food and consumer goods from Eastern Europe to the extent of some 660 million dollars, and Eastern Germany expects to import similar goods from this area, as well as from China which has little to export, in the amount of 125 million dollars. The captive area proper, suffering itself from an acute shortage of consumer goods, would thus be forced to contribute to the betterment of the Soviet and Eastern German economies at the rate of more than eleven dollars per capita of its population. Even if the governments of the area do their best to increase the standard of living of the working masses, much time must inevitably pass between the inauguration of the new policy and the actual increase in the production of consumer goods. For example, the present insufficient produc-

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642 have been made to the peasants, state cooperatives are still maintained in the heavy grain producing areas by forces other than the peasants' love of the soil and its products.

If the Yugoslav government will learn the meaning of Lord Acton's axiom on the nature of power, and if the West pursues an intelligent, long-range foreign policy supporting Yugoslavia against Soviet aggression, it may be possible to revive in Yugoslavia and hence in the Balkans as a whole the elements of an independent political life.

V

000 The months following the death of Premier Stalin in March 1953, saw a number of internal changes in the various people's democracies. The principal means of coercion and political control nevertheless remained unchanged: the army and the police forces. These were still bound tightly to Russian controls.

177, 70 701 The total number of men in the satellite armies available for service with the Soviet army has been estimated at a million and one-half. Since they are not only trained under Soviet 625 commanders, but operate under the Soviet military code, it is possible to state that the Sovietization of the satellite armies has been completed. Together with the armies, the satellite police form the backbone of the Soviet instruments of coercion. Estimated at a total of 700,000 men, police units organized in military formations range in function from the well-known secret police to People's Militia, Frontier Guards, and Railway Guards. Like the satellite armies, the satellite police are governed by Soviet regulations. Together they enforce a system of order which has been designed to conform with the Soviet model.

241 In common with Yugoslavia, certain states in the orbit are ● 656 strengthening the weakest sector of the economy: agriculture. It is not certain that the Yugoslav experience compelled the

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changes in agricultural policy in the people's democracies. The only causal factor common to both areas is a very practical one: agricultural production has not been in a position to supply the needs of the growing industrial population. The socialist objective of complete nationalization of agriculture has nevertheless not been retracted or withdrawn. On the contrary, the satellites are acting within the orthodox pattern of Soviet experience.

In the economic sphere, the orbit is passing through a period comparable to the Russian New Economic Policy. In the words of Stalin this is a "special policy of the proletarian state counting on the tolerations of capitalist elements, the commanding heights being in the hands of the proletarian state. . . .", in short a policy which aims "at overcoming capitalist elements and building a socialist economy by the method of a direct exchange of products. . . ." As if the Soviet experience itself did not suffice as a guide, there is the advice of Stalin on the proper agricultural policy required to prepare the transition to communism: continued development of the country's industrial resources, the gradual adjustment of collective farming to the nationalized sector of the economy, and the raising of the standards of living and culture. All these the satellite states are in the process of attempting to accomplish. There may be compromises in the short run, but there will be no compromise regarding the ultimate objective—the complete socialization of agriculture.

Changes in agricultural policy are particularly marked in those countries which have been heretofore heavily agricultural: Yugoslavia, Hungary, Albania, and Bulgaria. The restiveness of the population arising from the social and economic consequences of enforced industrialization made these changes necessary. The changes are short-run changes. While budgets for agricultural development will be increased, prices lowered for industrial goods and increased for farm products, establishment of producer cooperatives delayed,